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The question of whether aversive outcomes are generally preferred at sooner or 
at later times in the future is examined. Theories predicting choices of advanced 
and deferred aversive outcomes are summarized. A previous result suggesting 
overwhelming preference for more immediate aversive outcomes is challenged on 
the basis of problems endemic to experimental studies of decision making. An 
experiment that attempted to circumvent those problems is described. Subjects 
chose between sums of money that could be lost at various times in the future. 
The subjects were evenly divided in their preferences for advanced and deferred 
losses. Subjects in a control condition duplicated the results of the previous 
experiment that had demonstrated the predominance of preferences for advanced 
aversive outcomes. The implications of the conclusions for a representation of 
choice over deferred outcomes are discussed. 
Do people prefer that losses or other misfortunes be experienced in 
the near or in the more remote future? For instance, given the choice, 
will the typical individual rather have a lawsuit brought against him in a 
month or have it postponed for six months? This paper discusses several 
conditions that might underlie decisions to advance or defer aversive 
outcomes. It also identifies problems inherent to experimental studies of 
delay of punishments. Finally, an experiment that attempted to circum- 
vent those problems and answer the original question is described. 
Some notational conventions will facilitate the discussion. Borrowing 
a term from Jamison (1970), let us call a decision alternative offering an 
outcome x receivable at time interval t from the present a "simple op- 
tion" (x,t). It is understood that x is receivable immediately or in the fu- 
ture, i.e., t >/0. Let the status quo be represented by the outcome 
symbol e. The binary relations " < "  and " - " ,  defined over the set of all 
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pairs of simple options, are to be interpreted as "is less preferred than" 
and "is indifferent to," respectively. The basic question can be restated 
compactly as follows. Suppose that for all t, (x,t) < (e,t), i.e., x is "aver- 
sive." Suppose further that 0 < t~ < t2. Is it the case that for most peo- 
ple (X,tl) < (X,t2) , (x,t2) < (X,tl) , o r  (x , t l )  ~ (X,/2)? 
As simple as such a question is, previous research on decision making 
has produced little evidence pertinent to the question either directly or 
indirectly. Though most theories of decision making are neutral on the 
matter, almost all empirical studies of decision making have involved 
"benign" choices. That is, typically, subjects have been required to eval- 
uate or express preferences among options such that the worst that can 
happen to the subject is that he will leave the experiment empty-handed. 
(For reviews see Edwards 1954, 1961; Becker & McClintock, 1967; 
Rapaport & Wallsten, 1972). It remains an open and unexamined ques- 
tion whether the dominant decision theories are as descriptive of choices 
among alternatives involving traumatic consequences as they have been 
for more pleasant dilemmas. 
Most models of decision making tested by experimental psychologists 
also have not involved the second distinctive feature of the choices of 
interest here: variable outcome receipt time. Almost universally, sub- 
jects have experienced the outcomes of their decisions immediately. 
Fortunately, related concepts have been at least thought about by psy- 
chologists with other primary interests and also by economists. Note- 
worthy have been studies of the theory of investment and related 
topics in measurement (e.g., Fisher, 1954; Koopmans, 1960; Fishburn, 
1970, Chap. 7; Jamison, 1970), investigations of delayed reinforcement 
in conditioning (see Renner, 1964, for a review), and studies of propen- 
sities to delay gratification (e.g., Davids, 1969; Levine & Spivack, 1959; 
Melikan, 1959). A series of studies spawned by the latter tradition 
provide about the only observational evidence pertaining to the issues of 
the present study. The experiments of Mischel and his colleagues (e.g., 
Mischel, 1961a,b,c; Mischel & Metzner, 1962; Mischel & Grusec, 
1967; Mischel, Grusec, & Masters, 1969) represent the most extensive 
and systematic attempt to gain an understanding of preferences for 
deferred consequences, aversive or otherwise. 
No theory, economic or psychological, predicts that people will be 
indifferent between (x,tl) and (x,t2). There are, however, arguments sup- 
porting predictions of preferences either way. First, consider an indirect 
chain of reasoning suggesting that (X,tl) < (x,t2), i.e., aversive conse- 
quences are preferred later rather than sooner. Mischel and others ar- 
gue that delay implies uncertainty inherently: " . . .  a bird in hand . . ." 
This unassailable observation is often offered as a partial explanation of 
the weU-documented fact that people generally prefer having good 
things sooner than later. Classical economic theory (cf. Fisher, 1954) 
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offers another plausible explanation for preferences for advancirzg the 
receipt of beneficial consequences, at least money. If one receives a 
sum of cash today rather than a year from now, if nothing else he could 
deposit the money in the bank, collect interest, and be X% richer 
a year from now than he would be otherwise. In other words, failure 
to advance receivables represents opportunity costs. Even in some 
nonmonetary situations an analogous argument for advancing good 
things can be supported. For instance, receiving recognition for an ac- 
complishment this year rather than next implies that one can reap the 
benefits of the recognition in the interim and be just that much farther 
ahead when the year finally rolls around. Koopmans (1960) has iden- 
tified formal conditions on preference structures that imply the existence 
of "impatience," a term Fisher (1954) attached to the propensity to 
prefer the earlier receipt of good things. Symmetric arguments all lead to 
the conclusion that aversive consequences should be preferred later 
rather than sooner. 
How might preferences for advancing aversive outcomes be ex- 
plained? Mischel, Grusec, and Masters (1969) offer one rationale. They 
argue that waiting for aversive consequences is itself aversive. It is as if 
the person faced with an unpleasant chore concludes, "Well, I might as 
well get it over with and stop worrying about it." Mischel et al. (1969) 
report an experiment that seems to support their position that people 
generally advance aversive outcomes. 
It is worth noting that certain conditions in an economy can imply the 
rationality of preferences for either the immediate or deferred loss of 
commodities or money. Suppose the exchange value of a commodity is 
decreasing over time. Or, as in an inflationary economy, suppose the 
purchasing power of a currency is diminishing with time. In such cir- 
cumstances the payment of debts should be deferred as long as possible 
since the true loss represented by the actual goods and services forgone 
by payment of the debt decreases as time goes on. Precisely the converse 
holds in a deflationary economy. 
Undoubtedly, all the influences suggested by the arguments above af- 
fect decisions to advance or defer aversive consequences. The only 
choice data brought to bear on the question to date, that of Mischel and 
his associates, lead to the rather surprising conclusion that influences to 
advance aversive outcomes dominate overwhelmingly. There are reasons 
to question the meaning of the Mischel results, however. Before con- 
sidering the problems of interpreting the Mischel experiment, let us 
describe the essentials of that study. 
College student subjects were offered options of participating in elec- 
tric shock experiments at four different times: immediately, or in 7, 14, 
or 21 days from the day they were questioned. Conditions were orga- 
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nized such that regardless of whether a subject was to receive a shock on 
a particular day, he was required to be present for other purposes. Thus, 
there was control for the inconvenience of having to return to the experi- 
mental setting. The procedure for recruiting and compensating subjects 
is particularly significant. The subjects were students in a psychology 
course who were required to participate in experiments in order to 
receive full course credit. Hence, at the end of the experiment, i.e., after 
the shock was administered, each subject was assured that he had at 
least partially fulfilled his course requirement. Presumably because it in- 
volved an unpleasant electric shock, during the experiment subjects 
were reminded of their option to withdraw from the study. The primary 
results of the experiment were that when subjects were given the option 
of receiving shocks at either of two times, they overwhelmingly chose 
the earlier of the times. There was no correlation between preferences 
for earlier shocks and scores on the Taylor Manifest Anxiety scale 
which was also administered to the subjects. 
The following argument asserts that the Mischel procedure did not 
provide a test of the question of whether people prefer aversive con- 
sequences either sooner or later. The argument rests on problems in- 
volved in inducing subjects to participate in the experiment and the sub- 
jects '  rather than the investigators' perceptions of the choice options 
offered to them. It will be recalled that an aversive outcome is one that 
is less desirable than the status quo. The Mischel options very likely did 
not satisfy that criterion in the subjects' eyes. In order to induce people 
to serve in experiments they must be offered compensation that will 
make participation to their net advantage rather than disadvantage. 
Hence, it is completely reasonable that Mischel's subjects perceived the 
fulfillment of their course requirement to more than compensate for the 
promised shock. Otherwise they would have resigned from the experi- 
ment. Put another way, their participation in the experiment is sufficient 
evidence that as far as the subjects were concerned, the effective choice 
outcome was x = "shock plus fulfillment of course requirement" and not 
x = "shock." Further, (e,t) < (x,t), for all t, i.e., x is not aversive. In this 
light, it is not at all surprising that the subjects generally preferred the 
sooner shock. This is merely a replication of numerous findings that 
beneficial outcomes are preferred at earlier dates. The fact that there 
was no relationship between anxiety scores and choices of earlier shocks 
is consistent with the assertion about the subjects' perceptions. If the 
outcomes are not aversive, there is no reason for anxiety arousal to be a 
choice factor. 
Given the necessity to compensate experimental subjects for their 
participation, is it possible to test our question experimentally? Yes, 
and the key to the approach is to separate, at least in the subjects' per- 
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ceptions, compensation for participation and the outcomes of choices 
made in the experiment, The Mischel procedure clearly failed to do this 
since all compensation was tied explicitly to the decision outcomes at 
the time choices were made. The strategy of the present study was, in 
contrast, the following. 
Subjects were recruited with the general understanding that they 
would receive some unspecified monetary reward for participating. They 
were paid a large base fee prior to the actual experiment. Intervening 
tasks were arranged to distract attention away from the compensation. 
Then, options for sums that could be "lost," i.e., amounts to be repaid to 
the experimenters, at various dates in the future were presented to the 
subjects. A control condition that simulated the Mischel procedure 
required subjects to express preferences among options that offered 
identical net amounts of money as the options in the experimental condi- 
tion. 
Representation of the conditions in terms of simple options should 
clarify their meaning and their relationship to the Mischel experiment. 
Let c denote (base) compensation for participating in the study, the 
present or Mischel's. In this investigation, c is the fee paid to experi- 
mental condition subjects prior to the experiment. In the Mischel study, 
c represents fulfillment of a course requirement. The symbol x' repre- 
sents an aversive outcome presented to the subject. In the Mischel 
experiment, x' represents a shock. In the present study, x' is an amount 
of money (Ix' I < c) the subject could be required to repay or "lose" to 
the experimenters. In either case, it is assumed that x' is aversive, i.e., 
less preferred than the status quo. The Mischel procedure required sub- 
jects to choose among simple options of the form (x,tl) and (x,t~), where 
x = c + x' and, as usual, tl < t2. In contrast, in the experimental condi- 
tion of the current study, subjects received their basic compensation c 
prior to the actual experiment. During the course of the experiment they 
made choices among simple options of the form (x',ti) and (x',t2). In the 
control condition subjects were required to choose among simple op- 
tions involving x = c + x', as in the Mischel experiment, but with c and 
x' as defined in this study, x = c + x' represents amounts actually re- 
ceived by the subjects as their net pay for participation. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Thirty-five female students at Rice University volunteered to serve as 
paid subjects in the study. The subjects volunteered with the under- 
standing that they would be compensated by some amount of money to 
be determined precisely during the course of the study. Sixteen of the 
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subjects served in the experimental condition, while the remaining 19 
subjects participated in the control condition. 
Personality Instruments 
Two personality instruments were administered in the experiment. 
The first device consisted of the course examination part of the 
Mandler-Sarason Test Anxiety Questionnaire (TAQ) (Mandler & 
Cowen, 1958). The second instrument included items from the Mul- 
tidimensional Internal-External (I-E) Control Scale (Gurin, Gurin, Lao, 
& Beattie, 1969). 
Stimuli 
The stimuli used in the main part of the study represented pairs of 
simple options. 'The simple options had three dimensions: money, payoff 
time, and probability of payoff. The third factor, uncertainty, was in- 
troduced primarily to obscure the purpose of the study and thereby dis- 
courage strategies to "outwit" the procedure. Accordingly, only a subset 
of the pairs of simple options actually presented to subjects are of in- 
terest. 
Table 1 lists the simple options employed. Consider first the simple 
options included in the experimental condition. The options consist of 
the 12 combinations of two amounts of money to be repaid to the experi- 
TABLE 1 
PARALLEL SIMPLE OPTIONS IN THE EXPERIMENTAL AND CONTROL CONDITIONS 
Experimental Control Experimental Control 
(Amt,. prob., (Amt., prob., (Amt., prob. ,a (Amt., prob., compl, amt. ,~ 
period) period) period) period) 
(-$1, 1.0, ($2, 1.0, (-$1, 0.6, ($2, 0.6, $3, 15 days) 
15 days) 15 days) 15 days) 
(-$1, 1.0, ($2, 1.0, (-$1, 0.6, ($2, 0.6, $3,35 days) 
35 days) 35 days) 35 days) 
(-$1, 1.0, ($2, 1.0, (-$1, 0.6, ($2, 0.6, $3,75 days) 
75 days) 75 days) 75 days) 
(-$2, 1.0, ($1, 1.0, (-$2, 0.6, ($1, 0.6, $3, 15 days) 
15 days) 15 days) 15 days) 
(-$2, 1.0, ($1, 1.0, (-$2, 0.6, ($1, 0.6, $3,35 days) 
35 days) 35 days) 35 days) 
(-$2, 1.0, ($1, 1.0, (-$2, 0.6, ($1, 0.6, $3,75 days) 
75 days) 75 days) 75 days) 
With the complementary probability the subject was required to repay $0. 
b The complementary amount was receivable with the probability complementary to that 
indicated explicitly. 
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menter by the subjects (-$1, -$2), three periods of time until the amounts 
were to be repaid (15 days, 35 days, 75 days), and two probabilities that 
the amounts would actually have to be repaid (1.0, 0.6). The simple op- 
tions in the control condition columns are "parallel" to the adjacent op- 
tions in the experimental condition columns. A couple of examples will 
make clear what is meant by parallel experimental and control condition 
simple options. A basic participation fee of $3 was paid initially to sub- 
jects in the experimental condition. Thus, assuming a subject in that con- 
dition actually received the simple option (-$1, 1.0, 35 days), her net 
gain from participating in the experiment would be $2. The control con- 
dition simple option parallel to that option would offer the same net gain 
35 days hence. That is, the parallel simple option is ($2, 1.0, 35 days). 
The simple option ($2, 0.6, $3,15 days) in the control condition is paral- 
lel to (-$1, 0.6, 15 days) in the experimental condition since both options 
imply the same expected net value. The former simple option implies 
that with probability 0.6 in 15 days the owner would be paid $2; other- 
wise she would receive $3. The bearer of the latter simple option was 
paid $3 initially and with probability 0.4 would be able to keep it all; 
with the complementary probability she would be required to return $1 
in 15 days. 
Within each condition 66 distinct pairs of different simple options 
could be constructed. For obvious reasons, those six pairs consisting of 
options that differ only in the amounts of money involved were of no 
interest. Each of the remaining 60 pairs of simple options in each condi- 
tion were printed on separate response sheets. Care was taken to bal- 
ance the order of presentation of simple options containing the various 
probabilities, payoffs, and periods. Probabilities were indicated by par- 
tially or completely darkened pie diagrams intended to represent a wheel 
of fortune that was actually used to determine payoffs. Each sheet con- 
tained blanks to allow the subject to indicate her preference between the 
options described therein. Figure 1 displays two response sheets with 
the basic format used in the study. 
Procedure 
Experimental condition. Subjects were run in groups. Before any 
experimental procedures were begun, each subject was paid $3 for her 
participation. She was required to sign an official university accounting 
voucher certifying that she had been paid the amount. Preliminary 
payment and signing of the vouchers were intended to enhance the 
impression that the payment was a fait accompli and should have little 
bearing on the subjects' subsequent behavior in the experiment. 
The subjects were then told that the purpose of the study was to 
examine the effects of value, uncertainty, and time on preferences for 
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Please indicate with an "X" in the appropriate blank 
the I.O.U. you would prefer to owe to the Psychology 
Department (you must choose one or the other): 
15 days 
Pay $2.00 _ _ .  
Pay $0.00 
15 days from now, either pay the Psychology Department $2.00 
if the spinner stops on the dark part of the circle or nothing if 
it stops on the light part. 
Pay $2,00 _ _ .  
75 days 
Pay $0.00 
75 days from now, either pay the Psychology 
Department $2.00 if the spinner stops on the 
dark part of the circle or nothing if it 
stops on the light part. 
Please indicate with an " X "  in the appropriate blank 
the I.O.U. you would prefer receiving from the Psychology 
Department (you must choose one or the other): 
Receive $1.00 _ _  
15 days 
Receive $3.00 
15 days from now, either receive from the 
Psychology Department $1.00 if the spinner stops 
on the dark part of the circle or $3.00 if it 
stops on the light part. 
Receive $1.00 _ _  75 days from now, either receive from the 
Psychology Department $1.00 if the spinner stops 
75 days on the dark part of the circle or $3.00 if it 
Receive $3.00 stops on the light part. 
FIG. 1. Typical response sheet formats for the experimental (top panel) and control 
(bottom panel) conditions. 
losses. Particular care was taken to emphasize "losses." When they 
asked, subjects were assured that their eventual losses would not exceed 
the amount they were paid initially. All further mention of the initial 
payment was avoided. The subjects were told that the methods to be 
used for assessing effects of amounts, uncertainty, and time were both 
"direct and indirect." 
The so-called indirect methods consisted of the personality measure- 
ment devices the subjects were then required to complete. The primary 
reason for having the subjects respond to the personality instruments 
was to further distract attention from the participation fee paid initially. 
This was the exclusive reason for including the I-E Scale. Assuming 
that TAQ scores reflect at least partially more general anxiety tend- 
encies, it was thought that they might provide an additional test of the 
Mischel et al. hypothesis that immediate aversive consequences might 
be preferred in order to eliminate extended periods of discomfort over 
impending misfortune. 
After the personality instruments were administered the subjects were 
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required to choose between the two simple options represented as 
"I .O.U. 's"  on each page of their stimulus booklets. The subjects were 
cautioned to be very careful in expressing their preferences since their 
choices would have real implications. They were informed that each pair 
of simple options was numbered. At the end of the experimental session 
each subject would have the opportunity to draw a "ticket" from a well- 
mixed bag of such tickets. The 60 tickets in the bag corresponded to the 
simple option pairs under current consideration. The subject's require- 
ment to repay money to the Rice psychology department would be 
prescribed by her response sheet corresponding to the ticket drawn. Of 
the two simple options represented on the chosen response sheet, she 
would be required to follow the prescription of the alternative she had 
previously indicated to be preferred. If the option so indicated involved 
a probability of 0.6, the ultimate outcome was determined by the spin of 
a wheel of fortune with 60% of its area designated as the losing region. 
After all subjects completed their choices among the pairs of simple 
options, they were allowed to indicate on an open-ended questionnaire 
any impressions they had of the tasks and their strategies for completing 
them. The experimenter then allowed each subject to go through the 
procedure of determining the amount, if any, she would be required to 
repay to the Rice psychology department at a specified future date. In 
the event that a subject so incurred a debt, she was required to sign a 
witnessed statement that she would pay the amount on the required 
date. The subject was informed that she would be provided through the 
mail with a self-addressed, stamped envelope to use in remitting the sum 
on the date it was due. 
Control condition. The procedure for the control condition was analo- 
gous to that for the experimental condition. The only major distinction 
concerned the payoff mechanisms. Subjects were not paid in advance. 
Rather, they were informed that they would receive the amount speci- 
fied in the simple option chosen by the drawing procedure and, if 
required, the subsequent spin of the wheel of fortune. The amount would 
be mailed to them from the Rice psychology department at a time such 
that, assuming normal postal operations, they would receive their pay- 
ment on the date implied in their simple option. 
RESULTS 
Subjects' choices of primary interest were those between pairs of 
simple options both with payoff probability 1.0 and equal amounts, but 
with differing payoff dates. There were six such choices made by each 
subject. Subjects were classified as "Advancers" if the majority of their 
choices among those simple options indicated a preference for the option 
with the sooner payoff date. Those subjects of the opposite persuasion 
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TABLE 2 
FREQUENCIES OF ADVANCED AND DEFERRED CHOICES 
303 
Condition 
Constant option Frequencies of 
factors a choices 
Dominant No. 







-$1 1.0 23 1 
-$2 1.0 24 0 
-$1 0.6 23 1 
-$2 0.6 24 0 
-$1 1.0 0 24 
-$2 1.0 0 24 
-$1 0.6 2 22 
-$2 0.6 1 23 
$2 1.0 52 2 
$1 1.0 53 1 
$2, $3 0.6 52 2 
$1, $3 o.6 53 1 
$2 ! .0 0 3 
$1 1.0 0 3 
$2. $3 0.6 0 3 
$1, $3 0.6 0 3 
a At each level of constant factors there were three comparisons for each subject, i.e., 
among simple options with payoff periods of 15 days, 35 days, and 75 days. 
were called "Deferrers." As it turned out, there were no subjects who 
split their choices evenly. Table 2 presents a summary of the choices 
among those six pairs of simple options made by Advancers and De- 
ferrers in both the experimental and control conditions. Though those 
preferences do not have direct relevance in the present study, Table 2 
also summarizes the choices of the subjects among simple options with 
constant amounts, differing payoff dates, and payment probability 0.6. 
As Table 2 suggests, the subjects within each classification were 
extremely consistent. In the experimental condition, among the Ad- 
vancers only 1 deferred choice out of 48 was made; among the De- 
ferrers no advanced choices were made. In the control condition, only 3 
of 108 choices made by Advancers were deferred; the lone Deferrer in 
that condition was perfectly consistent. The difference in the proportions 
of Advancers and Deferrers in the two conditions is pronounced. The 
group of subjects in the experimental condition was evenly divided 
between Advancers (8) and Deferrers (8), while the control condition 
group was heavily dominated by Advancers (18 of 19). Clearly, whether 
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subjects chose among experimental condition simple options or among 
their control condition parallel simple options led to a difference in tend- 
encies to advance or defer (p < 0.004, Fisher's exact probability test). 
There was no evidence that Advancers in the experimental condition 
were more anxious than Deferrers. The scores of the two groups of sub- 
jects on the TAQ were essentially the same, with Deferrers actually ap- 
pearing slightly more anxious (t (14) = - 1.967, n.s.). 
DISCUSSION 
The results provide clear evidence against the hypothesis that people 
overwhelmingly prefer that aversive consequences be experienced 
sooner rather than later. The preferences of the control condition sub- 
jects practically duplicate those obtained by Mischel et al. (1969). This 
suggests that in Mischel's experiment, as was clearly the case in the con- 
trol condition of the present study, the subjects did not view their 
decision outcomes as aversive. 
The behavior of subjects in the experimental condition offers direct 
support for the position that when those outcomes are really perceived 
as aversive, in a substantial number of instances people will prefer 
deferred outcomes to more immediate ones. A stronger statement is 
likely true. There was no difference in net gain offered to subjects in 
both conditions of the experiment. It could well be the case that for 
some of the Advancers in the experimental condition the procedures in- 
tended to draw their attention from the fact that they would realize a net 
advantage from participation in the study were unsuccessful. In other 
words, they might not indeed have separated decision outcomes from 
participation compensation. The finding that their anxiety scores were 
not higher than those of Deferrers is not inconsistent with this conclu- 
sion. Perhaps in situations in which consequences are more clearly aver- 
sive, the Advancers might become Deferrers. Thus, the evidence leans 
toward the conclusion that aversive outcomes generally are preferred 
later rather than sooner. 
What are the implications of these results? Maybe the present conclu- 
sions are applicable only to clear-cut financial choices. Comparisons 
with situations involving broader aversive consequences such as Mi- 
chel's electric shock might be inappropriate. That remains, however, to 
be demonstrated by future research that controls for the type of net 
compensation problems shown to be operative in the present study and 
very likely in Mischel's. 
As suggested above, a number of factors might contribute to a prefer- 
ence for deferred over immediate aversive outcomes. Certain of those 
factors are peculiarly operative in monetary transactions. Since the 
present study involved only monetary outcomes, the generalizability of 
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the conclusions to nonfinancial situations may be problematic. In partic- 
ular, the fact that the national economy was inflationary at the time of 
the experiment may have contributed significantly to preferences for 
deferred rather than immediate losses of money. The question of 
whether or not such a pattern of preference would also hold for losses of 
constant-value commodities should be investigated directly. 
Fishburn (1970, Chapt. 7) has identified conditions sufficient to es- 
tablish a representation for preferences over what might be called 
"payoff streams." Payoff streams are merely generalizations of simple 
options to include outcomes receivable at several rather than single 
periods in the future. We might denote a payoff stream as follows: 
( x l , t l ; x 2 , t 2 ;  . • . ; x , , t , ) ,  where x l , &  . . . . .  x ,  are all members of a com- 
modity set A. The set of all payoff streams over a set of n periods in the 
future might be represented by the product set A ". Fishburn's theorem 
asserts the existence of a unique positive number rr and a continuous 
real-valued function p on A, unique up to a positive linear transformation, 
such that ( x , q ; x > t 2 ;  . . . ;Xn , t , )  ~ ( ya , t l ; y2 , t2 ;  . . • ;y , , t ,~)  if and only if 
¢ r ~ - I p ( & )  < ~ ¢ ? - ~ p ( y ~ ) .  When impatience holds rr < 1. The critical 
i= l  i=1 
(and clearly necessary) condition of the representation is independence 
of the n periods. 
The experimental condition of the present study might be viewed as a 
realization of t h e  circumstances modeled by the Fishburn represen- 
tation. The compensation c is receivable at to = 0, i.e., in the present, 
while the potential loss x' is "receivable" at some later period tl or t2 
time units away. In other words, the options presented to subjects in 
that condition might be symbolized by two-period payoff streams (c, to; 
x ' , q )  and ( c , to ;  x ' , t 2 ) .  From this perspective the results of this investiga- 
tion suggest two things. First, since the initial outcomes of each of the 
payoff streams presented to subjects were identical, if interperiod in- 
dependence holds, then choices should be determined solely by the out- 
comes in the periods indexed by t~ and t> The point of the extensive ef- 
forts to separate initial compensation from subsequent losses was to 
achieve such independence. The data imply that this attempt was not 
always successful. Thus, we must conclude that the independence as- 
sumption underlying Fishburn's representation can hardly be expected 
to be satisfied generally, or even often. However, on those occasions 
when independence c a n  be assumed, perhaps the representation does 
provide an accurate description of choice behavior over deferred out- 
comes. The conjecture awaits empirical test. 
The second implication of the results of this study in relation to the 
Fishburn representation concerns uniqueness of the implied value scale. 
The data of the present investigation suggest, indeed require, that such a 
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scale have a unique origin at the status quo. Preferences over deferred 
periods display a sign-dependency on outcomes (cf. Krantz, Luce, 
Suppes, & Tversky, 1971, pp. 329-338). Conditions needed to yield a 
representation equivalent to Fishburn's, but with a value function unique 
up to similarity transformations should be explored. 
REFERENCES 
Becket, G. M., & McClintock, G. G. Value: behavioral decision theory. AnnualReview of 
Psychology, 1967, 18, 239-286. 
Davids, A. Ego functions in disturbed and normal children: aspiration, inhibition, time es- 
timation, and delayed gratification. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 
1960, 33, 61-70. 
Edwards, W. The theory of decision making. Psychological Bulletin, 1954, 51, 370-417. 
Edwards, W. Behavioral decision theory. Annual Review of Psychology, 1961, 12, 
473-498. 
Fishburn, P. C. Utility theory and decision making. New York: Wiley, 1970. 
Fisher, I. The theory of interest. New York: Kelley and Mellman, 1954. 
Gurin, P., Gurin, G., Lao, R. C., & Beattie, M. Internal-external control in the motiva- 
tional dynamics of Negro youth. Journal of Social Issues, 1969, 25, 29-53. 
Jamison, D. Studies in individual choice behavior. RAND Memorandum No. P-4255, 
1970. 
Koopmans, T. C. Stationary ordinal utility and impatience. Econometrica, 1960, 28, 
287-309. 
Krantz, D. H., Luce, R. D., Suppes, P., & Tversky, A. Foundations of measurement (Vol. 
I). New York: Academic Press, 1971. 
Levine, M., & Spivack, G. Incentive, time conception and self-control in a group of emo- 
tionally disturbed boys. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 1959, 15, 110-I 13. 
Mandler, G., & Cowen, J. Test anxiety questionnaires. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 
1958, 22, 228-229. 
Melikan, L. H. Preference for delayed reinforcement: an experimental study among Pales- 
tinian refugee children. Journal of Social Psychology, 1959, 50, 81-86. 
Mischel, W. Delay of gratification, need for achievement and acquiescence in another cul- 
ture. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1961a, 62, 543-552. 
Mischel, W. Father-absence and delay of gratification. Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 1961b, 63, 116-124. 
Mischel, W. Preference for delayed reinforcement and social responsibility. Journal of Ab- 
normal and Social Psychology, 1961c, 62, 1-7. 
Mischel, W., & Grusec, J. Waiting for rewards and punishments: effects of time and proba- 
bility on choice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1967, 5, 24-31. 
Mischel, W., Grusec, J., & Masters, J. C. Effects of expected delay time on the subjective 
value of rewards and punishments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
1961, 11, 363-373. 
Mischel, W., & Metzner, R. Preference for delayed reward as a function of age, in- 
telligence, and length of delay interval. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 
1962, 64, 425-531. 
Rapoport, A., & WaUsten, T. S. Individual decision behavior. Annual Review of Psychol- 
ogy, 1972, 23, 131-176. 
Renner, K. E. Delay of reinforcement: a historical review. Psychological Bulletin, 1964, 
61, 341-361. 
RECEIVED: April 22, 1974 
